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INVESTORS AT CONFLICT’S CROSSROADS: AN OVERVIEW OF AVAILABLE 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS IN THE CRIMEAN CONTEXT 
Nataliia Tuzheliak* 
Abstract: The annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, as well as the conflicts in Georgia and 
Cyprus, pose questions such as to what extent states can and should guarantee long-term 
investment protection in the contemporary dynamics of the international legal order. This 
article does not analyse the broader problems concerning territorial and diplomacy issues; 
rather, it centres on problems regarding economic interests and property rights protection. 
This article provides an overview and analysis of the international venues for protection of 
investors and investments from third states’	 conduct outside their borders. This article 
analyses the conflict in Crimea, a peninsula located in southern Ukraine. This case study is 
used as a backdrop for the examination of investment treaties’	application (and applicability), 




Global political processes affect the development of the international legal order. It took 
centuries for societies to codify the principles of civil protection in times of armed conflict, 
including concepts like force majeure and hardships.1 The international investment law 
regime has traditionally viewed investors and investment protection as its centre of gravity 
and has attempted to balance the investor’s interests with the state’s legitimate right to 
regulate.2 If an external stream of great velocity disturbs this system, the balance is lost for 
the whole habitat. 
The conflict over the Crimean Peninsula provides a backdrop for the analysis 
undertaken in this article. Geographically, Crimea is a peninsula located in the south of 
Ukraine, surrounded by the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Historically, the Crimean 
Peninsula was part of the Bosporus Kingdom, Byzantine and Ottoman empires. Catherine II 																																																								
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1 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 August 1949, 
entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 (Fourth Geneva Convention). See also Joern Rimke, ‘Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of International Trade Practice with Specific Regard to the CISG and the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts’ (2001) 84 Pace Intl L Rev 197. 
2 Roland Kläger, Fair and Equitable Treatment’ in International Investment Law (CUP 2011) 162. 
DOI: 10.14324/111.2052-1871.087 
 
   15 
of Russia established a long-lasting protectorship over the peninsula in 1783.3 The Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) held it under its control from 1921, lost it briefly to 
Nazi Germany and reclaimed it at the end of World War II. In 1954, Crimea was acquired by 
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and remained a part of Ukraine as an independent 
state since 1991.4 
 After the 2014 civil disturbances and revolution in Ukraine,5 which resulted in a 
presidential election and the formation of a new government, Russian military troops started 
to assert control over the peninsula6 in violation of the Budapest Memorandum on Security 
Assurances.7 After the Russian military intervention and rebellious demonstrations in support 
of Crimea’s independence, a referendum on the status of Crimea was held.8 Notwithstanding 
its unconstitutionality from the Ukrainian domestic perspective,9 the referendum results were 
ratified and followed by a declaration of sovereignty.10 Russia officially recognised that 
declaration11 and subsequently ratified the Agreement on Admission of the Republic of 
Crimea into the Russian Federation (Crimea Agreement), formally incorporating  the 
Crimean territory into its federal structure.12 
 The international community’s reaction to these events in the form of economic 
sanctions imposed against Russia13 resulted in countersanctions and expropriation of foreign 																																																								
3 Thomas Milner, The Crimea, its Ancient and Modern History (General Books 2012). 
4 Paul Kubicek, The History of Ukraine (Greenwood Press 2008). 
5 ‘The February Revolution: Can Ukraine Find any Leaders Who Will Live up to the Aspirations of its Battered, 
Victorious but Skeptical Protesters?’ The Economist (27 February 2014) 
<www.economist.com/news/briefing/21597974-can-ukraine-find-any-leaders-who-will-live-up-aspirations-its-
battered-victorious> accessed 4 July 2017. 
6 William Booth and Karen DeYoung, ‘Reports of Russian Military Activity in Crimea Prompts Stern Warning 
from Obama’ The Washington Post (1 March 2014) <www.washingtonpost.com/world/ukraine-calls-russian-
troops-invasion/2014/02/28/e066bfc8-a0be-11e3-878c-65222df220eb_story.html> accessed 16 August 2016. 
7 UNSC Res 1399 (19 December 1994) UN Doc S/RES/1399. 
8 Ian Birrell, ‘Crimea’s Referendum was a Sham Display of Democracy’ The Guardian (17 March 2014) 
<www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/17/crimea-referendum-sham-display-democracy-ukraine> 
accessed 27 August 2016. 
9 Constitution of Ukraine (adopted 28 June 1996, entered into force 13 July 1996) 30 Official Journal of the 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 141 arts 135–37. 
10 ‘Crimea’s Parliament has Formally Declared Independence from Ukraine and Asked to Join the Russian 
Federation’ BBC News (17 March 2014) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26609667> accessed 16 August 
2016. 
11 Steven Myers and Peter Baker, ‘Putin Recognizes Crimea Secession, Defying the West’ The New York Times 
(17 March 2014) <www.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/world/europe/us-imposes-new-sanctions-on-russian-
officials.html?hp&_r=1> accessed 16 August 2016.  
12 On Ratification of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the 
Admission of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and on the Creation of New Constituent 
Entities within the Russian Federation see Federal Law of the Russian Federation No 36-FZ of 21 March 2014 
(Crimea Agreement).  
13 UNGA ‘Territorial Integrity of Ukraine’ UNGA Res 68/262 (27 March 2014) UN Doc A/RES/68/262. See 
also Richard Happ and Sebastian Wuschka, ‘Horror Vacui: or why Investment Treaties Should Apply to 
Illegally Annexed Territories’ (2016) 33 (3) J Intl Arb 245; Gaiane Nuridzhanyan, ‘Ukraine vs Russia in 
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investment by Russia in Crimea.14 The process of establishing an administration over the 
territory – the so-called legal ‘russianization’	 of Crimea – began in March 2014 with the 
nationalisation of property in late April 201415 and nearly complete establishment of the 
Crimean Federal system of governance, a process which allegedly ended in late 2014.16 
 This complex geopolitical situation falls in line with the peninsula’s history.17 At the 
same time, that geopolitical and inter-state-centred analysis overlooks arrangements 
concerning the general protection of individuals heavily affected in their rights. These rights 
have different sources: customary international law dealing with inter-state matters; 
international human rights law conferring rights directly to individuals; and international 
foreign investment law dealing with individual and corporate foreign investors. 
 International law without adjudication has been the norm in international affairs.18 
Many international legal frameworks have existed without a judicial enforcement mechanism 
attached to them.19 Moreover, states have historically gone out of their way to justify all sorts 
of illegal behaviour from the viewpoint of international law.20 The lack of effectiveness of 
traditional enforcement mechanisms gave rise to so-called judicialisation of international law. 
In turn, the proliferation of international courts and tribunals has caused fragmentation21 but, 
at the same time, increased the availability of different adjudicative settlement options.22  
																																																																																																																																																																												
International Courts and Tribunals’ EJIL:Talk! (9 March 2016) <www.ejiltalk.org/ukraine-versus-russia-in-
international-courts-and-tribunals/> accessed 30 April 2017. 
14 According to the United States Department of State: ‘…[i]n late March, Senator Andrei Klishas of the 
Federation Council, the upper chamber of Russia’s national legislature, said the Council plans to draft 
legislation which would allow the confiscation of property, assets, and accounts of American and EU 
companies, including private companies, as a retaliatory measure on possible sanctions from the US and EU’ in 
‘Executive Summary: 2014 Investment Climate Statement’ US Department of State. Diplomacy in Action (15 
June 2014) <www.state.gov/documents/organization/228199.pdf> accessed 16 August 2016. See also Lyudmila 
Alexandrova, ‘Crimean Roads may be Nationalised’ TASS (25 March 2014) <www.tass.ru/en/russia/725137> 
accessed 18 July 2016. 
15 On the Matters of Property Management of the Republic of Crimea, Decree of the Council of State of the 
Republic of Crimea No 2085-6/14 of 30 April 2014 (as amended on 3 September 2014). This decree concerns 
transfer of property and its operational management to the Russian Federation for an indefinite period. 
16 Nikolai Petrov, ‘Crimea: Transforming the Ukrainian Peninsula into a Russian Island’ (2016) 54(1) Russian 
Politics & L 74. 
17 Nuridzhanyan (n 13). 
18 Sir Robert Jennings compares judicial settlement to the ‘extreme decision, non-pacific alternative of war’, 
stressing that referring to the international court shall not be ‘an act of routine’ as in municipal law, in Laurence 
Boisson de Chazournes, Marcelo G Kohen and Jorge Viñuales, Diplomatic and Judicial Means of Dispute 
Settlement (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012) 328. 
19 Ian Cram, Terror and the War on Dissent: Freedom of Expression in the Age of Al-Qaeda (Springer Science 
& Business Media 2009) 25. 
20 Judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal 1946 (1947) 41 AJIL 172. 
21 Cesare P R Romano, ‘The Shadow Zones of International Judicialisation’ in Cesare PR Romano, Karen J 
Alter and Chrisanthi Avgerou (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (OUP 2013) 128. 
22  Philip C Jessup, ‘The Reality of International Law’ Foreign Affairs (1 January 1940) 
<www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1940-01-01/reality-international-law> accessed 24 August 2016. 
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 Focusing on the economic harm suffered as a result of the political clashes at the root 
of the conflict, this article analyses the judicial venues for protection of foreign investors in 
Crimea. It argues that, although foreign investors have multiple international judicial fora 
where their rights may be asserted, these venues are seriously limited. The overall conclusion 
is that these venues are a toolbox of valuable but limited options for investors in the midst of 
a challenging situation. The argument will be developed in three sections.  
 The first pillar of the argument deals with the direct protection of foreign investments 
and of foreign investors in Crimea through the investor-state arbitration framework. It 
portrays the essential idea that property and individuals are the objects of protection under the 
investment treaty regime. Following the establishment of the object of protection, it explores 
a variety of jurisdictional issues. The study analyses the fulfilment of material and personal 
components of the scope of protection in the investment treaty regime between Russia and 
Ukraine. The first issue regards the status of Crimea itself, which remains de jure territory of 
Ukraine and consequences of this status vis-à-vis companies incorporated in Ukraine and 
their foreign shareholders. The second issue concerns illegality of territorial acquisition and 
its interrelation with the principles on succession of treaties.  
 The second section analyses available venues of protection under human rights 
frameworks. Available avenues analysed regard individual applications and inter-state 
proceedings. It is suggested that regional human rights frameworks, particularly the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), allows for the extraterritorial application of certain 
obligations and thus the protection of individual rights. This article studies the possibility of 
applying personal and territorial models of jurisdiction for the purpose of ascertaining the 
applicability of investment treaties vis-à-vis Russia. It suggests that the effective control 
model would allow to ascertain that Russia may be legally liable vis-à-vis harmful actions 
that affected investors in Crimea. The nationality requirement present in investment law does 
not play a substantial role in the human rights treaty protection regime as it does in the 
investor-state treaty framework. In addition, an analysis regarding the limitations on the 
protection of shareholders’	rights under this system is offered. Finally, the article analyses the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement and the issue of reparations in the human rights 
context.  
 The third section elaborates on the diplomatic protection framework. This route, it is 
argued, offers an attractive possibility for investors whose home states do not have an 
investment framework with Russia. However, this regime has considerable limitations, 
including its discretionary and politically sensitive nature.  
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 This article does not aim to provide an exhaustive examination of all available judicial 
venues. There may be other possibilities. However, those analysed in this article are well-
established functioning forums that, in any case, are limited in the concrete circumstances 
present in situations of unlawful acquisition of territories. The article also does not seek to 
provide analysis on the illegality of Russia’s use of force in Crimea. It is generally accepted 
and is a premise of the article upon which this analysis is offered that Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea is not consistent with international law on the matter.23 The purpose is rather 
different: showing how international law, for all its limitations, remains the ultimate source of 
protection for individuals and their rights in the midst of complex and overwhelming 
situations in the international political arena. 
 
B. THE INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTORS IN CRIMEA 
1.  Conceptions of foreign investors and foreign investment 
The object of protection under the investment regime concerns both individuals and property. 
Historically, investors are regarded as individuals in the first place, whereas the protection of 
corporate bodies as investors has been almost completely ignored until recently.24 
 In general, the facilitation of foreign investment as the fundamental purpose of the 
regime presumes investors, both corporate and natural persons, to be ‘foreign’. This creates a 
requirement of investors’	 nationality25 or permanent residency,26 in order for them to be 
subjects of rights.27 With a higher degree of complexity, the same rule applies to corporate 
investors. It requires, respectively, a legal entity to be incorporated under the law of a 
contracting state,28 or to have a corporate seat in a contracting state,29 to conduct substantial 
																																																								
23 UNGA Res 68/262 (2014) (n 13) para 5. 
24 Martins Paparinskis, The International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable Treatment (OUP 2013) 
217. 
25 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between the States and Nationals of Other States 
(adopted 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966) 575 UNTS 159 (ICSID Convention) art 25(2)(a). 
26 North American Free Trade Agreement (adopted 12 December 1992, entered into force 1 January 1994) US 
Gov’t Printing Office 1992 (NAFTA) art 201. See also Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments (signed 13 June 1989, entered into force 5 August 1991) (‘Germany-Soviet Union BIT’) art 1. 
27 Zachary Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (CUP 2009) para 602. 
28 Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17 December 1991, entered into force 16 April 1998) 2080 UNTS 95 (ECT) 
art 1(7). 
29 Germany-Russia BIT, art 1(1)(c). 
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business activities, owned and controlled by a natural or legal person of a contracting state’s 
nationality or incorporation.30 
 With regards to property, the term ‘investment’	 evolved from the flexible and 
pragmatic approach31 of contribution, certain duration and acceptance of risk,32 into a more 
complex concept where it is the consent of the parties that shapes the meaning of investment 
in different treaty instruments.33 The parties to the treaty can define what type of asset34 or 
economic contribution constitutes an investment.35 The Tribunal in Romak SA v Uzbekistan 
concluded: 
[I]rrespective of whether the investor resorts to ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitral 
proceedings, investment entails a contribution that extends over a certain period of 
time and involves some risk …	 [I]f an asset does not correspond to the inherent 
definition of investment, the fact that it falls within one of the categories listed in [the 
BIT] … does not transform it into investment.36 
Put another way, the consent of the contracting parties constitutes and limits the meaning of 
investment.37 On this basis, tribunals consider a particular contribution or an economic 
activity in light of its inherent definition38 with reference to the applicable treaty wording.39 
Investors, both natural and legal persons, therefore have different venues available for 
the protection of their rights. Foreign investment arbitration is available to both individuals 
and corporations, while international human rights protection focuses mainly on individuals. 
Diplomatic protection, in turn, is exercised by states on behalf of investors, be they natural or 
legal persons. Keeping this differentiation in mind, the article now turns to the analysis of the 
investment treaties’	mechanism as a direct system of protection. 
2.  The pragmatic approach to the applicability of investment treaties in the territory 
of Crimea 
																																																								
30 Tokios Tokelės v Ukraine, ICSID Case No ARB/02/18, Dissenting Opinion (Chairman Prosper Weil) of 29 
April 2004. 
31 Biwater Gauff Limited v Tanzania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/22, Award of 24 July 2008, para 316. 
32 Salini Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v Morocco, ICSID Case No ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction of 
23 July 2001. 
33 Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v Malaysia, ICSID Case No ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction of 
17 May 2007, para 48. 
34 ECT, art 1(6). 
35 Romak SA v Uzbekistan, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No AA280, Award of 26 November 2009, para 205. 
36 ibid paras 180, 207. 
37 NAFTA, art 1139. 
38 Abaclat and Others v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 28 
October 2011, para 364.  
39 Douglas (n 27) para 604. 
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a)   Jurisdictional challenges for arbitral tribunals in current disputes concerning 
investments in Crimea 
Ukraine has triggered proceedings at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in relation to the Crimean conflict. 
These are not analysed in this article because they do not directly concern the protection of 
investment in Crimea, or only have ancillary implications in that regard.40 
 Eight investment arbitration proceedings have been launched following the 
annexation of Crimea, two of which are being brought by Ukrainian state-owned 
companies.41 Ukrainian investors have brought claims under the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules 197642 (UNCITRAL Rules) pursuant to the 
bilateral Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine on the Encouragement and Mutual Protection of Investments43 (Russia-
Ukraine BIT). As the matter stands at the time this article is being drafted, Russia44 does not 
recognise the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.45 However, this did not preclude the arbitral 
tribunal from issuing its awards addressing certain issues of jurisdiction.46 Although the 
																																																								
40 Case Concerning the Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Ukraine v Russian Federation) (Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures: Order) General List No 
166 [2017] ICJ 1. See also Kimberley Trapp, ‘Ukraine v Russia (Provisional Measures): State ‘Terrorism’ and 
IHL’ EJIL: Talk! (2 May 2017) <www.ejiltalk.org/ukraine-v-russia-provisional-measures-state-terrorism-and-
ihl/> accessed 4 May 2017; Iryna Marchuk, ‘Ukraine’s Dashed High Hopes: Predictable and Sober Decision of 
the ICJ on Indication of Provisional Measures in Ukraine v Russia’ EJIL: Talk! (24 April 2017) 
<www.ejiltalk.org/ukraines-dashed-high-hopes-predictable-and-sober-decision-of-the-icj-on-indication-of-
provisional-measures-in-ukraine-v-russia/> accessed 3 May 2017; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, ‘The 
Hearing of the Case Ukraine v Russian Federation under UNCLOS will Start at the Beginning of 2017’ (23 
December 2016) <www.mfa.gov.ua/en/press-center/news/53422-na-pochatku-2017-roku-rozpochnetysya-
rozglyad-spravi-ukrajina-proti-rosijsykoji-federaciji-zgidno-z-konvencijeju-oon-z-morsykogo-prava> accessed 
3 May 2017. 
41 Sergejs Dilevka, ‘Arbitration Claims by Ukrainian Investors under the Russia-Ukraine BIT: between Crimea 
and a Hard Place?’ CIS Arbitration Forum (17 February 2016) 
<www.cisarbitration.com/2016/02/17/arbitration-claims-by-ukrainian-investors-under-the-russia-ukraine-bit-
between-crimea-and-a-hard-place/> accessed 18 April 2017. 
42 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, UN Doc A/65/465 (2010). 
43 Stabil LLC and others v Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2015-35; Lugzor LLC and others v 
Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2015-29; PJSC Privatbank and Finance Company Finilion 
LLC v Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No AA568; Everest Estate LLC and others v Russian 
Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No AA577; Aeroport Belbek LLC and Mr Igor Kolomoisky v Russian 
Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2015-07; PJSC Ukrnafta v Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA 
Case No 2015-34. 
44 Mutatis mutandis Netherlands v Russia, UNCLOS, PCA Case No 2014-02, Award on Jurisdiction of 26 
November 2014, para 5 (The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration). 
45 Aeroport Belbek LLC and Mr Igor Kolomoisky v Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2015-07 
(Pending) PCA Press Release 192615 (The Hague, 9 March 2017) <www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1703> 
accessed 8 August 2017.  
46 ibid; PJSC Ukrnafta v Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2015-34 (Pending), Stabil LLC and 
others v Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2015-35 (Pending) PCA Press Release 202236 (The 
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awards themselves remain confidential, the significance of the tribunal’s conclusions cannot 
be underestimated as this is believed to be the first time that a tribunal has found a BIT to be 
applicable in a territory regarded by the international community as illegally occupied.47 
Prior to the phase on the merits, the investors submitted arguments on the matter of 
jurisdiction,48 namely the existence of an investment (ratione materiae)49  made in the 
‘territory’	of a contracting state (ratione loci)50 at the time when the obligations were already 
in force (ratione temporis) by the investor –	a national of the other contracting state (ratione 
personae).51 Under the Russia-Ukraine BIT, investment tribunals have jurisdiction over  
any dispute between either Contracting Party and the investor of the other Contracting 
Party, which may arise in connection with the investments …	 [that denote]52 all kinds 
of property and intellectual values put in by the investor of one Contracting Party in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party ….53 
This approach is conventional for bilateral as well as multilateral treaty instruments.54 Hence, 
to establish whether a treaty applies in the first place, it is necessary to tackle issues 
connected to the meaning of ‘territory’ and ‘nationality’, as well as to address concerns 
regarding temporality matters. 
b)   Territoriality of investment treaties 
The term ‘territory’	 in ‘territory of the other Contracting Party’55 may be interpreted as the 
‘entire territory’56 within the actual and effective exercise of jurisdiction,57 or narrowed to the 
strict literal meaning58 of ‘territory under the sovereignty’	in some treaty instruments.59 																																																																																																																																																																												
Hague, 4 July 2017) <www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw9180.pdf> accessed 8 August 
2017. 
47 Alison Ross, ‘Crimea Cases against Russia to Proceed’ Global Arbitration Review (9 March 2017) <www. 
globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1137587/crimea-cases-against-russia-to-proceed> accessed 15 April 2017. 
48 Shabtai Rosenne, The World Court: What it is and How it Works (5th edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995) 
283. 
49 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 60. 
50 Michael Waibel, ‘Investment Arbitration: Jurisdiction and Admissibility’ (2014) University of Cambridge 
Legal Studies Research Paper 9/2014 <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2391789> accessed 9 July 2016. 
51 Douglas (n 27) paras 297, 616. 
52 Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the 
Encouragement and Mutual Protection of Investments (signed 27 November 1998, entered into force 26 January 
2000) (‘Russia-Ukraine BIT’) art 9(1). 
53 ibid art 1. 
54 NAFTA, arts 1(7), 10, 13, 26; ECT, arts 1101–16. 
55 Douglas (n 27) para 285. 
56 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 
UNTS 331 (VCLT) arts 15, 29, 31. 
57 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn, OUP 2008) 112. See also International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171 (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) (ICCPR) art 2. 
58 Burgos v Uruguay (1981) Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 88. 
59 ECT, arts 1(10)(a), 26(1). 
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 The Russia-Ukraine BIT’s articulation of this element regards ‘the territory of the 
Russian Federation or the territory of Ukraine and also their respective exclusive economic 
zone and the continental shelf as defined in conformity with the international law’.60 
Therefore, in strict legal terms, economic contributions made by the investors of Ukrainian 
nationality in the territory of Crimea –	 a part of Ukraine –	 cannot be characterised thus 
protected as investments within the ordinary meaning of the BIT terms.61 This broad 
definition brings into play different instruments and sources of international law, such as 
investment treaties and customary international law on territoriality and state succession. As 
to the former, article 12 of both the Russian and the Ukrainian original BIT texts62 read as 
follows: ‘[t]he agreement shall apply to all investments carried out by the investors of one 
Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party, as of January 1, 1992’.63 
Thus, the main concern arising therefrom is whether the Russia-Ukraine BIT extends its 
application to the territories acquired by either of the contracting parties.64 
 There are relevant policy considerations involved in this exercise of treaty 
construction, concretely regarding its extended application to all investments in a state’s 
entire territory,65 including territory which is subsequently annexed through legal or illegal 
means. Particularly, there is a plausible, pragmatic – insofar as it would enable the protection 
of individual investors – argument favouring the idea of characterising Crimea as Russian 
territory, at least since the formal annexation took place.  
 Putting forward the customary international law argument, the principles of 
succession support the extended application only if consistent with the ordinary meaning, 
object and purpose of the treaty66 and insofar as it does not fundamentally change the 
conditions of operation.67  
 The purpose of the investment treaty regime is to protect investors and to promote 																																																								
60 Russian-Ukraine BIT (n 52) art 1. 
61 VCLT, arts 31(1), 32. 
62 Russia-Ukraine BIT (n 52) art 14(3). 
63 ibid art 12. 
64 Victoria Ishchenko, ‘How to Obtain Compensation for the Lost Investment in the Annexed Crimea?’ 
(Ukrainian Bar Association, 4 August 2017) <www.youtube.com/watch?v=EKoxujVljP0&feature=youtu.be> 
accessed 8 August 2017. 
65 The term ‘extended application’ of investment treaties is attributed to Happ and Wuschka (n 13). The authors 
argue that rules on the succession of treaties allow extended application of investment treaties under certain 
circumstances, including when it accords the object, purpose of the treaty and extends the conditions of 
operation. That, according to the authors, constitutes a pragmatic approach to the extension of the Russian 
investment treaties to the territory of Crimea. 
66 VCLT, arts 31(1), 32. See also Sanum Investments Ltd v Laos, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2013-13, Award 
on Jurisdiction of 13 December 2013, para 230 (Sanum PCA). 
67 Sanum PCA (n 66) para 87. 
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economic cooperation.68 Thus, it arguably favours	the extended application of the treaty that 
covers investments in the area expanded that includes the annexed territory, so as to include 
investors which would otherwise be deprived of protection. This idea was underlined in 
Sanum Investments Ltd v Laos. In that case, the tribunal held that depriving Macanese 
investors of the protection granted by one hundred thirty BITs of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) would leave only a few investors protected under two BITs concluded by 
Macao.69 
 However, the landscape of protection in the Crimea situation is different. As 
simultaneously developed investment frameworks, Ukraine and Russia – former Soviet 
Union republics – feature sixty-three BITs in force concluded by the latter and fifty-seven by 
the former with similar versions of the boilerplate rules concerning their operation and level 
of protection.  
 For example, British70 and Austrian71 investors in Crimea72 could possibly rely on the 
BITs with either Ukraine or Russia. For them, either construction would yield protection, at 
least in the abstract. Conversely, other foreign investors, including those from Georgia and 
the US would be deprived of protection if the extended (pragmatic) construction were 
favoured. This is due to the absence of investment treaties in force between those states and 
the Russian Federation. Finally, recourse to multilateral treaty instruments, in particular the 
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), is limited due to the termination of its provisional application 
by the Russian Federation.73 Consequently, succession of investment treaties may apply if it 
accords to the purpose of the treaty and does not limit the existing level of protection.74 
																																																								
68 Douglas (n 27) para 234. 
69 Sanum PCA (n 66) para 107. 
70 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments (signed 6 April 1989, entered into force 3 July 1991) (UK-Soviet BIT) arts 1(a)(d)(e), 2; Agreement 
between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of 
Ukraine for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (signed 10 February 1993, entered into 
force 10 February 1993) (UK-Ukraine BIT) arts 1(a)(c), 2. 
71 Agreement between the Federal Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic 
of Austria for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (signed 8 February 1990, entered into 
force 1 September 1991) (Russia-Austria BIT) arts 1(1)(a)(b), 2; Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of Austria and the Government of Ukraine for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
(signed 8 November 1996, entered into force 1 December 1996) (Austria-Ukraine BIT) arts 1(1)(2)(6), 2.  
72 State Statistics Service of Ukraine, Annual Report of the Foreign Direct Investment in Ukraine (State 
Statistics Service of Ukraine 2014). 
73 Energy Charter Protocol on the Questions of Energy Efficiency and Corresponding Ecological Aspects, 
Federal Decree of the Russian Federation No 1055-p of 30 July 2009. 
74 Luis Gonzales Garcia, ‘Comparing with Famous. Why Crimea is not Kosovo and Relevance of Comparison 
from the Prospective of International Law’ Juridicheskaya Praktika (Kyiv, 20 May 2014) 
<www.pravo.ua/article.php?id=100109207> accessed 21 July 2017. 
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A tribunal may also look for an alternative argumentation and analyse all references to 
the meaning of the relevant treaty instrument. For instance, article 1(1) of the Russia-Ukraine 
BIT reads as follows: ‘investments shall denote all kinds of property and intellectual values, 
which are put in by the investor of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party in conformity with the latter’s legislation’.75 In addition, article 2 contains 
a reference to the mutual obligation of each contracting party to guarantee, in conformity 
with its legislation, the complete and unconditional legal protection of investments and 
investors of the other contracting party.76 In the context of these provisions as well as 
customary international law,77 it is possible to conclude that the territory, pursuant to the 
applicable treaty wording, shall denote any piece of land where either of contracting parties 
exercises its legal and regulatory control, including any subsequently acquired or 
incorporated territory. 
It is doubtful whether determining the applicability of the Russia-Ukraine BIT requires 
a decision on the legality of the territorial acquisition within a meaning of article 1(4). This is 
because the Russian and the Ukrainian original BIT texts may be read differently when 
compared with the English translation. Whilst the English version of article 1(4) refers to the 
term ‘territory’ defined in conformity with international law, the comma placed in the 
original Russian and the Ukrainian texts78 allows for a different interpretation. Both original 
texts may be read in a way to provide that only the parties’ respective exclusive economic 
zone and the continental shelf shall be defined in conformity with international law whereas 
territory means ‘the territory of the Russian Federation or the territory of the Ukraine’.79 
Had the tribunal decided to bring articles 15, 29, 31 and 32 of the VCLT into play, 
Russian investment treaties would be automatically applicable in the territory of Crimea, 
unless any of the established exceptions are deemed relevant. This interpretation arguably 
accords the inclusive wording of the applicable investment treaty as well as its parties’ 
intentions to grant the widest possible protection in order to strengthen mutual economic ties. 
Furthermore, this approach allows for the avoidance of the need to elaborate on the 
international illegality argument and to answer the main question put before the tribunal, 
which is whether this treaty is applicable to the new territorial units acquired by either 
contracting state. 																																																								
75 Russia-Ukraine BIT (n 52) art 1(1). 
76 ibid art 2(2). 
77 VCLT, art 29. 
78 Russia-Ukraine BIT (n 52) art 14. 
79 ibid art 1(4). 
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Finally, in accordance with the principle pacta sunt servanda, the Russian Federation 
that incorporated the Crimean Peninsula into its federal structure shall be liable for non-
fulfilment of any legal obligation arising out of that incorporation, including its investment 
treaties. 
3.  Limitations to the approach of the treaty extension to annexed territories 
a)  Time limitations 
Another question put before the tribunal regards the implications of the scenario in 
which a state exercising legal control over the territory at the time when investments are 
made is different to a state controlling part of its territory at the moment of expropriation. It 
may be argued that starting from March 2014, when the Russian Federation ratified the 
Crimea Agreement, all investments in the territory of Crimea became foreign investments for 
Ukraine and domestic for Russia. 
According to article 12 of the Russia-Ukraine BIT: ‘[t]his Agreement shall apply to 
all investments carried out by the investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the 
other Contracting Party, as of January 1, 1992’.80 Historically, this date is related to the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union.81 Hence, regardless the fact that this agreement was entered 
into in November 1998 and came into force in January 2000,82 all investments made after 
January 1, 1992 were to be retrospectively protected under its provisions. 
There are some important discrepancies in the wording of articles 1(1) and 12 of this 
agreement. In contrast to the terms ‘carried out’ used in article 1283 vis-à-vis past continuous 
actions, the term ‘put in’ used in relation to investments in article 1(1) places a complete 
performance requirement in past time.84 Conversely, the Russian and Ukrainian original texts 
of article 1(1) use the present continuous tense of ‘carrying out’ in regards to investments.85 
Taking into account the general retrospective effect of this treaty, its wording may be 
interpreted in support of the position favouring continuation of investment, in contrast with 
the requirement of investing in the territory of another contracting state ab initio. Based on 
this analysis there may be no need to define the exact moment in time when the protected 
investments were made and for what period as long as these occurred after January 1, 1992. 
 b)  Investors and investments 
Nationality of an investor is a precondition for the existence of protected investment 																																																								
80 ibid art 12. 
81 George Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders (CUP 2002) 274. 
82 Russian-Ukraine BIT (n 52) art 14(1)–(3). 
83 ibid art 12. 
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under the investment treaty. The Russia-Ukraine BIT protects the investments by Ukrainian 
nationals and companies owned and controlled by Ukraine86 carried out in the territory of the 
Russian Federation in conformity with its legislation and vice versa.87 
Thus, Ukrainian nationals and corporate entities registered in Ukraine may be 
required to prove that their investment is recognised under Russian law. Regulations dated 25 
July 201488 and 31 July 201489 adopted by the Crimean federal authorities may be of 
assistance. These acts provide that the Russian Federation recognised all licences and permits 
issued by the Ukrainian authorities and, consequently, all property rights attached to these 
documents. In addition, the Federal Constitutional Act90 adopted by Russia simultaneously 
with the ratification of the Crimea Agreement91 provides that all documents issued by the 
state authorities of Ukraine are recognised and valid in the territory of the Russian 
Federation. These provisions create a solid ground for arguing that investments by Ukrainian 
companies and individuals in Crimea are carried out in accordance with Russian law. 
It should be noted that some of the claimants in ongoing arbitration proceedings 
involving Ukrainian companies are in fact foreign shareholders.92 As such, these shareholders 
might fall under the scope of several investment treaties, for example those entered into by 
their state of nationality, therefore providing a distinct basis on which to bring a claim against 
the Russian Federation’.93 However, the scope of shareholders’	 protection depends on the 
terms of the respective treaty 94  and the ratione temporis link between the unlawful 
expropriation and the time when the investment was made.95 Consequently, the purchase of 
shares made after the illegal act took place will be outside of the ratione temporis jurisdiction 																																																								
86 PJSC PrivatBank (n 43). 
87 Dilevka (n 41). 
88 On Regulation of Property and Land Relations in the Territory of the City of Sevastopol, Law of the city of 
Sevastopol No 46-AP of 25 July 2014. 
89 On Management of Property and Land Relations in the Territory of the Republic of Crimea, Law of the 
Republic of Crimea No 38-3PK of 31 July 2014 (as amended on 15 March 2016) art 1. 
90 On the Incorporation of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation and the Establishment of New 
Units of the Russian Federation – the Republic of Crimea and the City of the Federal Significance of 
Sevastopol, Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation No 6-FKZ of 21 March 2014 art 12. 
91 Crimea Agreement (n 12). 
92 State Register Service, ‘Private Company Registration Database’ (Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, 14 January 
2015) <www.usr.minjust.gov.ua/ua/freesearch> accessed 19 August 2016. 
93 Enron Corp and Ponderosa Assets, LP v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(Ancillary claim) of 14 January 2004; Siemens AG v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/8, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 3 August 2004; Waste Management Inc v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/3, Award of 30 
April 2004 (Waste Management). 
94 Tokios Tokelés tribunal held that a company incorporated in Lithuania was entitled to bring a claim against 
Ukraine under the Lithuania-Ukraine BIT, although it was controlled and ninety-nine per cent owned by 
Ukrainian nationals in Tokios Tokelés (n 30) para 18. 
95 RosInvestCo UK Ltd v Russian Federation, SCC Arbitration V (079/2005), Final award of 12 September 
2010, para 162 (RosInvest Merits); Levi and Gremcitel v Peru, ICSID Case No ARB/11/17, Award of 9 January 
2015, paras 140–61. 
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of a constituted tribunal.  
 Taking this approach, UK shareholders of Rubenor LLC –	the Claimant in one of the 
pending disputes96	–	may also consider protecting their assets and share purchase under the 
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (UK-Soviet BIT).97 Invocation of ECT provisions on the 
protection of foreign shareholdings – an argument put forward by some commentators98 – 
seems to not be a valid option as the Russian Federation has never ratified that treaty.99 
Moreover, in 2009 Russia terminated the ECT provisional application and stated its intent not 
to become a party thereto,100 arguably due to its long-lasting arbitration with Yukos Universal 
Ltd.101 Thus, this option is unhelpful from a temporal perspective as the Crimean events 
leading to expropriation allegedly commenced in 2014 and hence fall outside of the 
temporary provisional application of the treaty. 
c)   International illegality 
The Sanum v Laos tribunal decided to extend the application of the PRC treaties to the Macao 
administrative region based on the purpose and wording of the PRC-Laos BIT. Firstly, the 
tribunal was dealing with the application of the treaties which third parties concluded after 
the acquisition of Macao. Secondly, the handover of Macao represents the resumption by the 
PRC to exercise its sovereignty over Macao.102 In the Crimea scenario, Ukraine and other 
possibly affected states explicitly objected to the legality of the acquisition when it occurred, 
continuing to sanction it up to present. 
 The extension of one state’s treaties to acquired territory formerly part of another state 
depends on the legal status of territorial acquisition.103 This condition was emphasised in the 
Sanum v Laos Judgment of Singapore’s High Court.104 The international community cannot 																																																								
96 Stabil LLC (n 43).  
97 RosInvest Merits (n 95) para 165. 
98 Odysseas G Repousis, ‘Why Russian Investment Treaties Could Apply to Crimea and What Would This 
Mean for the Ongoing Russo–Ukrainian Territorial Conflict’ (2016) 32 Arb Intl 2016, 459–481. 
99 Shareholders of the Crimea-Petrol LLC in Stabil LLC and the Claimant in PJSC Ukrnafta (n 43); ECT, art 
1(6). 
100 Irina Pominova, Risks and Benefits for the Russian Federation from Participating in the Energy Charter: 
Comprehensive Analysis (Energy Charter Secretariat Knowledge Centre, 2014) 
<www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Occasional/Russia_and_the_ECT_en.pdf> accessed 25 
July 2017. 
101 Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No AA 227, Final 
Award of 18 July 2014 (Yukos PCA). 
102 Sanum PCA (n 66) paras 81–110. 
103 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (adopted 23 August 1978, entered into 
force 6 November 1996) 1946 UNTS 3 (VCSS) arts 6, 15. 
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legitimise unlawful annexation,105 as the illegal use of force constitutes a violation of the 
Charter of the United Nations.106 
Hence, Doering’s,107 Happ’s and Wuschka’s108 pragmatic approach to the extension of 
investment treaties to ‘so-called dependent territories’109 cannot be justified as it is contrary 
to international law.110 Formulated differently, the treaty succession principles do not operate 
in complete isolation of sovereignty considerations under international law, nor do they 
regard foreign investment law as a self-contained regime. 
Should the tribunal choose to restrain from elaboration on the illegality argument, it 
may develop an alternative approach of analysis. This approach is built upon the literal and 
contextual reading of the treaty as well as the reciprocal guarantees of contracting parties to 
create and maintain favourable conditions for mutual investments on their respective 
territories. It allows for Russia to be deemed liable for all actions directed at expropriation of 
investments after ratification of the Crimea Agreement. 
 
C.  EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PROTECTION OF 
INVESTORS IN CRIMEA 
The relationship between the parties in a foreign investment dispute settlement bears a strong 
resemblance to the relationship arising out of human rights claims as both regimes originate 
in the law of state responsibility dealing with legal relationships between individuals and 
states.111 The human rights regime provides a model for protection of individual and 
corporate investors’	rights, as well as a more settled solution to the question of the attribution 
of extraterritorial unlawful conduct. 
1.  The human rights protection framework 
a)   Subject and object of human rights protection 
As previously suggested, the object of the investment regime to some extent accords with the 
purpose of the human rights framework: to protect individual rights and property. It is 																																																								
105 UNGA ‘Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security’ UNGA Res 2734 (XXV) (16 December 
1970) UN Doc A/RES/2734(XXV) para 2. 
106 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 892 UNTS 119 
(UN Charter) art 2(4). 
107 Karl Doehring, ‘The Scope of the Territorial Application of Treaties - Comments on Art 25 of the ILC’s 
1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties’ (1967) 27 H J Intl L 483, 488. 
108 Happ and Wuschka (n 13) 245. 
109 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United States and the Sultan of 
Muscat and Oman (US-Muscat-Oman) (adopted 20 December 1958, entered into force 11 June 1960) 380 
UNTS 181. 
110 UNGA Res 68/262 (n 13) para 5. 
111 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, NAFTA arbitration, 
Separate Opinion of Thomas Wälde of 1 December 2005, para 13. 
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commonplace for investors to seek protection under both regimes.112 More than twenty 
individual applications have been submitted to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR)113 in addition to an inter-state application filed by Ukraine against Russia.114 
 As Council of Europe Members, Ukraine and Russia participate in the Council’s 
structures including the ECtHR.115 The ECtHR has jurisdiction to decide on complaints 
concerning violations of the ECHR allegedly committed by a state party to the Convention 
that directly and significantly affected the applicant.116  
 The protection of investors under this legal framework mainly concerns the right to 
property, as guaranteed by Protocol No 1 to the ECHR (Protocol I). It is concerned with 
peaceful enjoyment of possession, protection from deprivation, and the right to control the 
use of property.117 Although there is no explicit notion of the term ‘expropriation’	 in the 
Convention, the ECtHR has provided guidance in its case law on whether measures taken by 
a state amount to expropriation118 as opposed to merely taking of control or discriminatory 
treatment.119 Procedurally speaking, states, individuals or groups of individuals may file 
applications before the ECtHR.120 Further analysis on these matters is offered below. 
b)   General requirements of the inter-state and individual applications mechanisms 
The erga omnes nature of the interests protected by human rights treaties ensures a member 
state’s right to act without any direct interest but rather to enforce the European public 
order.121 Hence, a state does not need to demonstrate any particular direct or indirect legal 
interest or to submit an application on behalf of an individual in order to trigger proceedings 
vis-order another state. Inter-state application requirements include the statement of facts and 																																																								
112 OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v Russia App no 14902/04 (ECtHR, 31 July 2014) (Yukos ECtHR); 
Yukos PCA (n 101) para 1827. 
113 ECtHR Press Release, ‘European Court of Human Rights deals with cases concerning Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine’ (26 November 2014) ECHR 345 (2014). 
114 ECtHR Press Release, ‘European Court of Human Rights communicates to Russia new inter-State case 
concerning events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine’ (1 October 2015) ECHR 296 (2015). 
115 Alexey Arbatov and Andrei Kolesnikov, ‘Does Russia Need the Council of Europe?’ Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace (4 February 2015) <www.carnegieendowment.org/2015/02/04/does-russia-need-
council-of-europe > accessed 21 August 2016. 
116 Karen Reid, A Practitioner’s Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2010) 243. 
117 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) art 1; Protocol No 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 222 
(Protocol I) art 1. See also Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in 
International Law’ (1982) 176 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 259, 345. 
118 Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration: 
Substantive Principles (OUP 2010) 288. 
119 Paparinskis (n 24) 220–23; Vasilescu v Romania App 27053/95 (ECtHR, 22 May 1998), paras 47–48. 
120 William A Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights. A Commentary (OUP 2015) 720–23. 
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alleged conventional breaches, as well as the applicant’s fulfilment of admissibility 
requirements.122 
 Conversely, an individual applicant must claim to be a victim directly affected by the 
impugned measure.123 Similarly, an individual application must contain a statement of 
relevant facts, alleged violations and compliance with admissibility criteria. 124  Having 
established the competence to deal with the matter laid before it on a preliminary basis,125 the 
ECtHR should consider the fulfilment of jurisdiction and admissibility criteria. This article 
deals only with issues which are problematic in the factual context of the Crimea case study. 
2.  Jurisdiction of the ECtHR 
a)   Principle of extraterritoriality in human rights 
A state’s jurisdictional competence under the human rights regime is primarily territorial.126 
In contrast to the currently unsettled practice of investment arbitration tribunals, the human 
rights regime has already developed extraterritorial solutions for cases involving an 
annexation-like scenario. 127  This principle is based on the premise that ‘acts of the 
Contracting states performed, or producing effects, outside their territories can constitute an 
exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of article 1’128 under the personal and territorial 
models of jurisdiction developed for the specific purpose of determining whether a treaty 
applies extraterritorially. 
 The personal model is concerned with inter alia the state’s authority through 
diplomatic and consular establishments, use of force and exercise of public powers.129 The 
territorial model triggers the human rights violations within the occupied territory of the 
ECHR espace juridique, but also beyond the territory of ECHR member states as developed 
in the ECtHR post-Banković case law.130 The approach taken in Banković is distinguishable 
from the ECtHR’s subsequent case law but should still be considered as relevant where both 
states are the ECHR Parties. 																																																								
122 ECHR, art 33. 
123 Vallianatos and others v Greece GC App no 29381/09 (ECtHR, 19 February 2013), para 47. 
124 ECHR, art 34. 
125 Georgia v Russia App no 38263/08 (ECtHR, 13 December 2011), para 64. 
126 Banković and others v Belgium and others App no 52207/99 (ECtHR, 12 December 2001), paras 61, 67; 
Ilaşcu and others v Moldova and Russia App no 48787/99 (ECtHR, 8 July 2004), para 312; Assanidze v 
Georgia App no 71503/01 (ECtHR, 8 April 2004), para 139. 
127 Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles and Policy (OUP 
2011). 
128 Banković (n 126) para 67. 
129 Cyprus v Turkey App no 25781/94 (ECtHR, 10 May 2001), para 77. 
130 Loizidou v Turkey App no 15318/89 (ECtHR, 23 March 1995), para 52; Banković (n 126); R (Al-Skeini) v 
Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, [2008] 1 AC 153; Jaloud v The Netherlands App no 47708/08 
(ECtHR, 20 November 2014). 
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b)  Instrumental character of human rights law in the context of the protection of 
investors 
Referring to the discussion at the beginning of this article, irrespective of the legality of 
territorial acquisition, investors whose property was expropriated in that territory must be 
protected.131 Under the principle of extraterritoriality, international obligations may be owed 
by states outside their borders insofar as the relevant conduct occurs within a state’s 
respective ‘jurisdiction’. Thus, if treaty obligations are invoked extraterritorially, the relevant 
adjudicatory body will have to determine whether the conduct at issue occurred within the 
jurisdiction of the relevant state.132 There are two main approaches on ascertaining whether 
obligations are owed extraterritorially: the personal model of jurisdiction and the territorial 
model of jurisdiction.  
Under the personal model of jurisdiction, acts of the state agents committed in their 
official capacity133 may render certain obligations applicable with respect to persons under 
their control even if that conduct took place abroad. For instance, in Lopez Burgos v 
Uruguay, Uruguay was found liable for violations of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (‘ICCPR’).134 The conduct involved the kidnapping and torture of Argentinian 
victims committed in Argentina but perpetrated by Uruguayan agents. It was found that the 
victims were in those instances under Uruguay’s jurisdiction.135 Accordingly, the personal 
model is a likely option for an arbitral tribunal to adopt in order to avoid making 
pronouncements on the illegality argument when asserting its jurisdiction. Instead, the 
personal model would enable a tribunal work around the de facto control of Crimea by 
Russia.136 
Two potential problems arise. It may be problematic from both a factual and an 
evidentiary perspective to argue that illegal actions of informal groups137 against investors in 
Crimea would be attributable to Russia, as they will likely not satisfy the applicable 
threshold. According to the complete dependence control test established by the International 
Court of Justice in Nicaragua v US, if states carry out actions through private individuals 																																																								
131 Happ and Wuschka (n 13) 245. 
132 ECHR, art 1; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 2(1). 
133 The Claims of Rosa Gelbtrunk and the Salvador Commercial Company (El Salvador v United States) (1902) 
15 RIAA 455. 
134 Burgos (n 58). 
135 ibid para 13. 
136 Ross (n 47). 
137 Howard Amos, ‘Russia Signals End to Crimea Property Grab, but Investors Unlikely to Bite’ The Moscow 
Times (17 February 2015) <www.themoscowtimes.com/articles/russia-signals-end-to-crimea-property-grab-but-
investors-unlikely-to-bite-43989> accessed 19 August 2016. 
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under their direction and control, they will be liable under international law for conduct 
committed by those individuals.138 However, the threshold for attributing serious violations 
of international law by individuals to the state is high. In Nicaragua v US, the Court 
established that actions of US organs aimed at arming, training and equipping the rebels are 
sufficient for the purpose of attribution, but held that merely financing the rebels is not.139 
Providing evidence sufficient to clear the threshold necessary for the personal model of 
jurisdiction would be problematic due to the nature of the facts and events in the Crimea 
scenario. 
Furthermore, it is controversial whether the expropriation by Crimean local authorities 
could be attributable to Russia and, if so, since what point in time that would be so. If the 
local authorities of Crimea can be regarded as the state authorities since the entry into force 
of the Crimea Agreement,140 then all illegal actions of the local government of Crimea 
committed before this date will be attributable to Ukraine. Hence, the personal jurisdiction 
framework of analysis leaves a gap in the protection of investors. This is because protection 
would be subject to fine and delicate determinations as to which acts of Crimean authorities 
are attributable to Russia and which ones to Ukraine at any given point in time. 
As to the territorial model of jurisdiction, obligations are triggered where a state 
establishes effective control of another state’s territory.141 The ECtHR in Loizidou v Turkey142 
and Cyprus v Turkey143 held that where a state exercises de facto effective control over 
another state’s territory through its agents, third parties, including a subordinate local 
administration acting under its direction, it may be responsible for illegal acts committed in 
the territory under its effective control.144 For the purposes of extraterritorial application of 
investment treaties, this would mean that no protection is granted until Russia put the 
territory of Crimea under its de facto control. Again, the critical date of this is very 
speculative due to evidentiary considerations.145 
																																																								
138 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) 
(Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 14. 
139 ibid [99]–[115]. 
140 Crimea Agreement (n 12). 
141 James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (CUP 2013) 2.1.2. 
142 Loizidou (n 130) para 52. 
143 Cyprus (n 129) para 77. 
144 Loizidou (n 130) paras 62–64. 
145 However, the ICJ may bring some clarity in this regard depending on what transpires in the fact-finding 
portion of the debate between the parties in the ongoing case concerning the Application of the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v Russian Federation) (Pending) ICJ press release 
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 Hence, the direct investor-state system grants protection to individual investors in 
respect of their investment rights defined under the relevant framework. The principle of non-
legitimisation of illegally acquired territory precludes treaty succession. However, the 
flexibility of the system allows for consideration of the international rules on 
extraterritoriality in the context of investors’	protection. Both major models of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction raise serious concerns vis-à-vis their capacity to achieve the policy that underpins 
this approach: providing protection to investors in the broadest sense possible. Concretely, 
this is because of the inherent uncertainty regarding the temporal moment in which the treaty 
providing the legal basis for protection starts to be applicable extraterritorially in the first 
place. Although, provided that evidence allows a more flexible position to be established and 
the third party intervention is providing arguments in support of such position, investor-state 
arbitration may provide redress even in such complex and contradictory political scenarios. 
Helpful to some and unhelpful to others, this approach, however, does not add certainty in 
this system of international dispute resolution. 
The personal model of jurisdiction in the human rights context may hardly be 
applicable in the Crimea scenario because of the lack of evidence implicating Russian 
military troops partaking in the annexation.146 Moreover, establishing control of the Russian 
Federation over those actions would not be enough to attribute the actual property deprivation 
or other discriminatory actions against investors to Russia.147  
Firstly, this is due to the fact that the determination of the exact time when consent, 
invitation or acquiescence of the Crimea Government to transfer its authority in part or in full 
to Russia is highly complex from an evidentiary perspective. Secondly, all discriminatory 
actions against investors that are not committed by the agents of Russia under the personal 
model will not be attributable to Russia.148 
 The territorial model would apply through the exercise of governmental authority 
elements by the Russian Federation in Crimea and its control over the foreign investors (or 
investments). Importantly, in comparison to the investment treaty regime, the legal status of 
the Russian occupation is not determinative of the question of jurisdiction.149 As emphasised 
in Al-Skeini,	 ‘whenever the State through its agents exercises control and authority over an 
individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation to secure to that individual 
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147 Cyprus (n 129) para 77. 
148 Jaloud (n 130) para 119. 
149 ibid para 142. 
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the rights and freedoms under … the Convention …’.150 Hence, the Russian Federation may 
be found responsible for violations of the ECHR outside its sovereign territory in respect of 
the individual holder of the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. 
 This important implication of the ECHR, which guarantees a wider scope of 
protection than the Russia-Ukraine BIT and multilateral instruments has a twilight zone for 
the Ukrainian Government. As the so called ‘separatist’	 regime	 had been allegedly 
established in Crimea before the Russian military invasion, Ukraine may also be liable under 
the ECHR for its failure to ensure property rights of investors within its territory.151 
c)   Nationality of individual applicants 
A certain nationality is not a requirement for the protection of property under the ECHR. The 
protection may be granted on an extraterritorial level,152 following the case law of the 
ECtHR, be it the Banković standard of espace juridique,153 which would still be applicable in 
this instance, or a more advanced standard defined in inter alia Al-Skeini 154 and confirmed in 
Jaloud.155 
 Articles 1 and 34 of the ECHR and article 5 of Protocol I156 provide that everyone’s 
rights and freedoms within the Contracting Parties’ jurisdiction shall be protected and any 
victim of a violation committed by the Contracting Parties may file an application. Therefore, 
the standards of protection apply in the same manner for nationals and non-nationals of the 
ECHR Contracting states,157 both natural and legal persons.158 
 While practice concerning individual applications filed by natural and legal persons is 
settled, shareholders’	 standing to do so is a subject of debate. This is due to the nature of 
shareholding as a protected right159 and its relation to the particular company’s business.160 
As far as shareholding relates to the ownership of shares in a corporation 161  and 
corresponding rights to vote or to receive dividends and claim company’s residual assets after 																																																								
150 R (Al-Skeini) (n 130). 
151 Ilaşcu (n 126). 
152 Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Is the European Court of Human Rights an Alternative to Investor-state Arbitration?’ in 
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Francesco Francioni (eds), Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration (OUP 2009). 
153 Loizidou (n 130) para 78; Banković (n 126) para 80. 
154 R (Al-Skeini) (n 130). 
155 Jaloud (n 130). 
156 ECHR, arts 1, 34; Protocol I, art 5.  
157 Kriebaum (n 152). 
158 Protocol I, art 1. 
159 Agrotexim and others v Greece App no 14807/89 (ECtHR, 26 September 1995). 
160 Kriebaum (n 152) 223. 
161 Christoph Schreuer and Ursula Kriebaum, ‘The Concept of Property in Human Rights Law and International 
Investment Law’ in Stephan Breitenmoser, Bernhard Ehrenzeller, Walter Stoffel, Beatrice Wagner Pfeifer and 
Marco Sassoli (eds), Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (Nomos 2007) 743. 
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liquidation, it may well be qualified as possession,162 but not under any other scenario.163 Put 
differently, only shareholders’	property rights and not their financial interests are protected 
under the ECHR, a position the ECtHR borrowed from the Barcelona Traction reasoning.164 
 Applying this general rule to the Crimea scenario, both majority and minority 
shareholders cannot claim the consequential loss in the value of the shares165 resulting from 
mistreatment of the company, if the company can apply separately or through its liquidators. 
However, if the said mistreatment directly affects the businesses of the shareholder linked to 
the mistreated company’s business, in this case the shareholder may be regarded as a 
victim.166 
 Unlike in the human rights context, in the investment protection system an indirect 
expropriation without actual transfer or direct loss is still regarded as property taking,167 as it 
has an effect on the shareholders’	possession.168 This, of course, depends on the wording of 
the particular treaty in question. 
 To compare the two dispute resolution mechanisms, nationality and legal personality 
of the individual applicant do not play a decisive role in the activation of the protection under 
the ECHR. However, individual shareholders, especially minority shareholders and those 
whose possession is limited to monetary interest,169 or those only affected indirectly170 may 
lack separate standing from that of the company’s before the ECtHR. Thus, Ukrainian 
investors may arguably have more chances to protect their rights under the framework of 
ECHR vis-re the shareholders. Given the illegality of Russiatheannexation conduct, the 
illegality of follow-up conduct attributable to that state would be consistent from a systemic 
perspective and the principle of effective protection of individuals under a state jurisdiction. 
Thus, the human rights models of jurisdiction provide for a more adequate framework to 
ensure the protection of investors than the relatively unsettled investor-state models. 
																																																								
162 Sovtransavto Holding v Ukraine App no 48553/99 (ECtHR, 25 July 2002), para 9.  
163 Sarah C C Tishler, ‘A New Approach to Shareholder Standing Before the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2015) 25(2) Duke J Comp & Intl L 259. 
164 Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Judgment) [1970] ICJ 
Rep 3 [34]–[45] (Barcelona Traction case). 
165 Yarrow Plc and others v United Kingdom App no 9266/81 (ECtHR, 28 January 1983), para 185; Renta 4 
SVSA and others v Russian Federation, SCC Arbitration No 24/2007, Award of 20 July 2012, paras 17, 22–4 
(Renta 4). 
166 Agrotexim (n 159) paras 155–56. 
167 Waste Management (n 93). 
168 Paparinskis (n 24) 219. 
169 Siemens AG v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction of 3 August 2004, 
para 91. 
170 CMS Gas Transmission Co v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, Decision on Jurisdiction of 17 
July 2003, para 48. 
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3.  Admissibility under the ECHR: an analysis of the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies requirement 
Exhaustion of domestic remedies is generally required in a human rights regime but not in 
foreign investment frameworks.171 Neither the Russia-Ukraine BIT172 nor the ECT require an 
investor to make use of the domestic remedies before it can bring the dispute before an 
international tribunal. 
 The requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies applies to both inter-state and 
individual cases as a preliminary condition for the examination of the case on merits.173 The 
exceptions to this rule include denial of access to remedies, prevention from their exhaustion, 
and lack of effectiveness or adequacy of available remedies. 174  The exceptions apply 
provided that substantial175 evidence of these exceptions exists in relation to repetition, 
accumulation and official state tolerance of relevant human rights violations.176  
The first concern in this regard is the effectiveness and will of the Russian domestic 
judiciary to deal with issues related to the property claims of Ukrainian investors. The second 
concern is related to whether the ECtHR would be open to waive the requirement of domestic 
litigation in the annexing country in light of its decision in Demopoulos and others v Turkey. 
The Court held that where there is no direct correlation of the official recognition or the 
purported assumption of sovereignty of the annexing state over the annexed territory and the 
application of article 35 of ECHR, the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement was not 
to be waived.177 The third concern regards the independence of the Russian judiciary, which 
is obliged to refer  to the Russian Constitutional Court under article 125(4) of the 
Constitution 178  when considering the application of ECtHR decisions under certain 
circumstances.179 According to the most recent 2017 ruling of the Russian Constitutional 
Court,180 the state is not under an obligation to comply with ECtHR judgments,181 where a 																																																								
171 Paparinskis (n 24) 231. 
172 Russia-Ukraine BIT (n 52) art 9. 
173 ECHR, art 35. 
174 Schabas (n 120) 764–65; Caraon and others v United Kingdom App no 42184/05 (ECtHR, 16 March 2010). 
175 Georgia (n 125) paras 15, 32, 34. 
176 France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands v Turkey App nos 9940-9944/82 (Commission 
decision, 6 December 1983). 
177 Demopoulos and others v Turkey App nos 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03, 10200/04, 14163/04, 
19993/04, 21819/04 (ECtHR, 1 March 2010), para 101. 
178 Constitution of the Russian Federation (adopted 12 December 1993, entered into force 25 December 1993) 
237 Rossiiskaya Gazeta Newspaper 3 art 124(4). 
179 Maria Smirnova, ‘Russian Constitutional Court Affirms Russian Constitution’s Supremacy over ECtHR 
Decisions’ EJIL:Talk! (15 July 2015) <www.ejiltalk.org/russian-constitutional-court-affirms-russian-
constitutions-supremacy-over-ecthr-decisions/> accessed 21 August 2016. 
180 Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Judgment on the Compliance with a Ruling of the European 
Court of Human Rights of 19 January 2017 513 Rossiiskaya Gazeta Newspaper 2. 
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Strasbourg decision is deemed as incompatible with the Russian Constitution despite the 
finality and binding nature of ECtHR awards.182 
Finally, exhaustion of domestic remedies prior to the recourse to ECtHR may preclude 
the applicant from triggering investment arbitration procedures under the fork-in-the-road 
clause included in some investment instruments183 provided that the ‘triple identity’	 test is 
satisfied. As emphasised in Yukos v Russia,184	‘triple identity’	concerns the same identity of 
parties, cause of action and object of the dispute.  
4.  Available remedies 
Under the human rights regime, expropriation does not automatically lead to full 
compensation. In contrast, under the investment regime the duty to compensate is linked to 
expropriation and its lawfulness. In fact, ‘prompt and effective’ compensation is a constitutive 
element of the notion of lawful expropriation. Otherwise, the expropriation will be unlawful 
and a higher amount of compensation may be due. 185 Further, the threshold for a finding of 
expropriation in the human rights regime is higher than under the investment treaty 
framework and should amount to ‘total deprivation’. This excludes proportional and non-
discriminatory deprivation186 for public purposes.187 
 Thus, if the interference accords with public interests or does not impose a burden on 
the victim, a property owner may receive fair market value compensation.188 However, with 
protection of foreigners, the proportionality test threshold is raised under general principles of 
international law.189 Full compensation linked to the value of property taken exists only with 
regards to deprivation of property, whereas control of the enjoyment of possession will 
consequently bring the claimant just satisfaction.190 
 Finally, reparations awarded in investment proceedings and ECtHR proceedings are 
radically different. While in OAO NK Yukos the ECtHR awarded EUR 1,866,104,634,191 an 																																																																																																																																																																												
181 Yukos ECtHR (n 112). 
182 Iryna Marchuk, ‘Flexing Muscles (Yet Again): The Russian Constitutional Court’s Defiance of the Authority 
of the ECtHR in the Yukos Case’, EJIL:Talk! (13 February 2017) <www.ejiltalk.org/flexing-muscles-yet-again-
the-russian-constitutional-courts-defiance-of-the-authority-of-the-ecthr-in-the-yukos-case/> accessed 15 
February 2017; ECHR, art 46. 
183 ECT, art 26(3)(b)(i). 
184 Yukos PCA (n 101) paras 591–98. 
185 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 49) ch 13. 
186 Marckx v Belgium App no 6833/74 (ECtHR, 13 June 1979). 
187 Protocol I, art 1; Papamichalopoulos v Greece App no 14556/8923 (ECtHR, 24 June 1993); Sporrong and 
Lönnroth v Sweden App nos 00007151/75 and 00007172/75 (ECtHR, 23 September 1982). 
188 James and others v United Kingdom App no 8793/7921 (ECtHR, 21 February 1986), para 54. 
189 Kriebaum (n 152). 
190 ibid. 
191 Yukos ECtHR (n 112). 
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arbitral tribunal awarded in Yukos Universal Limited USD 50,020,867,798 in damages plus 
EUR 156,476 for the arbitration costs and USD 2,214,277 for legal representation.192 
 Another issue which casts doubts on the effectiveness of the ECHR framework 
concerns enforceability. Concretely, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation has 
decided that the Federal Constitution has priority over ECtHR.193 However, the enforcement 
system of arbitral awards presents its own problems. 
One example worth mentioning is the Yukos awards194  enforcement challenges. Yukos 
claimants have sought to enforce arbitral awards in jurisdictions where the Russian 
Federation assets can be found. Russia has never voluntarily complied with investment 
arbitration awards, so it is the process of enforcement that is crucial in ensuring the 
claimants’ reparation.195 
However, the process of enforcement of Yukos awards has thrown up its own host of 
challenges. Many awards have been set aside196 or their enforcement refused 197 at the seat of 
arbitration on a number of grounds. For example, The Hague District Court set aside an 
award in favour of  Yukos on the grounds that Russia had never ratified the ECT (on the basis 
of which the claim had been brought). This was surprising because the ECT contained a 
clause providing for the provisional application of the treaty upon signature alone. This 
experience of unsuccessful enforcement proceedings may present another hurdle in the ability 
to successfully hold Russia to account under the investment law system.198 
 To conclude, human rights and investment treaty frameworks are different worlds, 
‘but not apart’.199 Still, well-established jurisdictional flexibility, including extraterritorial 																																																								
192 Yukos PCA (n 101). 
193 Smirnova (n 179). 
194 The Russian Federation v Hulley Enterprises Limited, C/09/477160 / HA ZA 15-1; The Russian Federation v 
Yukos Universal Limited, C/09/481619 / HA ZA 15-112; The Russian Federation v Veteran Petroleum Limited, 
C/09/477162/HA ZA 15-2 (‘The Hague Court Judgments’) <www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw7258.pdf> accessed 8 August 2016. 
195 Julien Fouret and Perre Daureu, ‘Case Comment: Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v The Russian 
Federation - Enforcement of the Yukos Awards: A Second Noga Saga or a New Sedelmayer Fight?’ (2015) 30 
(2) ICSID Rev 336, 336. 
196  ‘The Yukos Affair. Baiting the Bear’ The Economist (London, 14 April 2016) 
<www.economist.com/news/business/21696960-russia-trying-impede-enforcement-massive-damages-award-
baiting-bear> accessed 14 February 2017. 
197 Anastasia Choromidou, ‘Investment Arbitration Award Enforcement – Yukos Saga Continues’ (International 
Arbitration Attorney Network, 6 December 2016) <www.international-arbitration-attorney.com/investment-
arbitration-award-enforcement/> accessed 21 June 2017. 
198 Daniella Strik, Georgios Fasfalis and Marc Krestin, ‘Yukos Awards set Aside by The Hague District Court’ 
Kluwer Arbitration Blog (27 April 2016) <www.kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/04/27/yukos-awards-set-aside-
by-the-hague-district-court/> accessed 26 July 2017. 
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International Law’ in Mark Bungenberg, Jörn Griebel, Stephan Hobe and August Reinisch (eds), International 
Investment Law (Hart Publishing 2015) 361. 
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protection and inclusive substantial protection granted to individuals regardless of nationality 
make ECtHR more feasible and accessible200 for the protection of Ukrainian investors in 
Crimea. At the same time, foreign investors with minority interests in Ukrainian companies 
will have better prospects of success in investment arbitration due to the existence of indirect 
and consequential losses standards. 
 
D.  DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTORS IN CRIMEA 
Diplomatic protection can be reasonably described as an old and well-established mechanism 
of protection in international law. The ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection (DADP) 
were adopted following its subtraction from the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, where 
Garcia Amador had originally placed some provisions on the subject. 201 The DADP define 
diplomatic protection in the following terms: 
…[D]iplomatic protection consists of the invocation by a State, through diplomatic 
action or other means of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of another State for 
an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that State to a natural or legal 
person that is a national of the former State with a view to the implementation of such 
responsibility.202 
 As Crawford maintains, diplomatic protection serves an important purpose in 
international law, as it sets the international minimum standard of protection of persons and 
property. 203 This is important because the protection of aliens embodies an important 
exception to the principle of sovereignty according to which what happens within a state’s 
jurisdiction pertains exclusively to its internal affairs.204 That is not the case regarding aliens, 
as they are themselves interests of their state of nationality, thus making wrongs caused upon 
them following the international responsibility by the host state, a wrong caused upon the 
state of nationality itself.205 
 There are advantages and limitations vis-à-vis the usefulness of diplomatic protection 
as one of the means for protecting foreign investors in Crimea. However, issues such as the 
standard of protection will not be covered here, as it does not pose a fundamental question 
																																																								
200 ECtHR’s Public Relations Unit ‘Your Application to the ECtHR: How to Apply and how Your Application 
is Processed’ (Strasbourg 2012). 
201 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries’ (1997-2006) UNGAOR Supp no 10 UN 
Doc A/61/10 (DADP). 
202 ibid art 1. 
203 Brownlie (n 57) 607. 
204 ibid 605. 
205 ibid 607. 
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given the factual circumstances serving as a vehicle for this analysis.206 Diplomatic protection 
will be analysed in the context of its advantages and limitations including nationality of the 
injured alien, exhaustion of domestic remedies and reparations. 
1.  Advantages of diplomatic protection 
First, the definition of diplomatic protection regards as objects of protection both individuals 
and property. This is an advantage if one considers that, as studied before, the human rights 
law framework requires a great deal of argumentative gymnastics if the purpose is to protect 
a certain type of property. 
 Second, diplomatic protection encompasses judicial means of dispute settlement, but 
also a wide array of diplomatic means, therefore providing for flexible avenues non-existent 
in investor-state arbitration and human rights forums. Moreover, pursuance of this avenue 
does not preclude the use other forums including human rights courts or investment 
tribunals207 unless specifically provided.208 
 Finally, on the policy level, Russia would be interested in being open to diplomatic 
protection claims by third states because that may carry an implied recognition of its 
sovereignty claims over Crimea.209 That has been precisely its overall narrative since the 
conflict arose. However, states exercising diplomatic protection in a way which legitimises 
Russia’s sovereignty claims would be in breach of the obligation ‘to refrain from any action 
or dealing that might be interpreted as recognising any such altered status of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea’.210 That, in turn, carries its own policy and international relations 
implications which would determine in the long term whether any diplomatic protection 
action is undertaken by third states whose nationals have been affected by Russian sponsored 
action in Crimea. 
2.  Limitations of diplomatic protection 
a)   Exhaustion of domestic remedies 
Customary international law211 requires investors to exhaust all available domestic remedies, 
i.e. judicial and administrative remedies212 provided in the legal system of the state alleged to 
be responsible for causing the injury.213 																																																								
206 ibid 614–16. 
207 DADP (n 201) art 15. 
208 ICSID Convention, art 27. 
209 Happ and Wuschka (n 13) 253. 
210 UNGA Res 68/262 (n 13); UNGA Res 2734 (XXV) (n 105). 
211 DADP (n 201) arts 14–15. 
212 Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula SpA (US v Italy) (Judgment) [1989] ICJ Rep 137 [59] (ELSI case). 
213 Brownlie (n 577) 472; Interhandel Case (Switzerland v United States of America) (Preliminary objections) 
[1959] ICJ Rep 6. 
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 In the specific circumstances of the Crimea scenario, exhaustion of domestic remedies 
raises a series of issues. Firstly, it is doubtful whether the Russian judicial system provides 
for effective remedies, particularly because serious concerns exist as to the independence of 
Russian courts when adjudicating politically sensitive issues.214 These considerations have 
been offered above and will not be restated here, but the issue is that there are grounds to 
suggest that the situation could surpass the abstract threshold of obvious futility,215 with 
complete absence of reasonable prospects of success.216 In those circumstances, the victim 
would not have to exhaust local remedies. 
 Secondly, as indicated in above concerning the ECtHR’s stance in Demopoulos v 
Turkey,217 the domestic remedies requirement may not be waived because of the hardships for 
an alien to exhaust them if the premise is that Russia acted extraterritorially and therefore the 
territorial jurisdiction218 of domestic courts is questionable. In any event, if Russia does not 
provide a reasonable possibility of effective redress, then this requirement may be waived.219 
 If the expectation is to obtain redress not from Russia but from Ukraine due to its 
failure to protect, aliens may alternatively seek the redress in the civil and commercial courts 
of Kyiv region in Ukraine due to the inability to deliver justice by the courts of Crimea in the 
temporarily occupied territories.220 
 According to the Law of Ukraine on Guaranteeing the Rights and Freedoms of 
Citizens and on the Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine: 
‘…[c]ompensation of damage caused to legal entities, citizens of Ukraine, foreigners and 
stateless persons as a result of the temporary occupation of Ukraine is fully vested in the 
Russian Federation as the country that performs the occupation’. 221  Hence, in these 
circumstances remedies should be exhausted, provided that the Ukrainian legal system 
guarantees their effectiveness. Whether this allows for redress for wrongs attributable to 
Ukraine based on non-compliance with its duty to prevent at stages preceding the annexation 
is, however, doubtful. 
b)   Nationality of the injured party 																																																								
214 Smirnova (n 179). 
215 Claim of Finnish shipowners against Great Britain in respect of the use of certain Finnish vessels during the 
war (Finland v Great Britain) [1934] 3 RIAA 1479, 1498. 
216 DADP (n 201) art 15. 
217 Demopoulos (n 160) para 101. 
218 Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (France v Norway) (Judgment) [1957] ICJ Rep 9 [39]–[40]. 
219 DADP (n 201) art 15. See also The Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case (Estonia v Lithuania) (Judgment) 
[1939] PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 76. 
220 On Guaranteeing the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and on the Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied 
Territory of Ukraine, Law of Ukraine No 1237-VII of 6 May 2014 arts 3, 5, 12. 
221 ibid art 5. 
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The nationality of an injured alien is crucial for the invocation of diplomatic protection. The 
rules on nationality in the diplomatic protection context are more restrictive vis-ricti regional 
human rights treaty rules discussed in the previous section. Judge Fitzmaurice reasoned as 
follows: 
[..T]he ‘bond to nationality’	 between the claimant State and the private party for 
whom the claim is brought must be in existence at the time when the acts complained 
of occurred, or it would not be possible for the claimant State to maintain that it had 
suffered a violation of international law ‘in the person of its national’.222 
Therefore, the nationality of the injured person must be continuous from the date of 
injury to the date of the official presentation of the claim, and must have been obtained for 
reasons unrelated to the claim and in a manner not inconsistent with international law.223  
 Rules regarding nationality of corporate entities are more complex than those relating 
to individuals. Corporate nationality is determined by reference to the place of 
incorporation,224 must be genuine225 and continuous.226 For this purpose, control by nationals 
of another state, business activities in the state of incorporation and financial control227 are 
relevant. 
Concerning shareholders, the practice is also uncertain. The state of nationality may 
protect direct rights of shareholders –	multiple nationals jointly,228 or separately, if the greater 
link of the injured person to one state or another is established.229 There is no authority 
regarding the right of the state to protect investors other than shareholders, such as nominees 
and trustees.230 However, it is not directly prohibited as long as the link between the state and 
the injured person is genuine and continuous. 
 According to the principles established in Barcelona Traction, the state of the 
shareholder’s nationality may exercise diplomatic protection if the company has ceased to 
exist in its place of incorporation231 or alternatively, where the state of incorporation was 
itself responsible for inflicting an injury on the company.232 In Case Concerning Elettronica 																																																								
222 Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Separate Opinion) [1970] 
ICJ Rep 3 [61] (Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice) (emphasis added). 
223 DADP (n 201) arts 5, 10. 
224 ibid art 9. 
225 Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) (Second Phase Judgment) [1955] ICJ Rep 4 [70]. 
226 Barcelona Traction case (n 164). 
227 DADP (n 201) art 9.  
228 Dallal v The Islamic Republic of Iran, Bank Mellat [1983] 3 Iran-USCTR 10. 
229 Nottebohm case (n 225). 
230 DADP (n 201) art 11. 
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Sicula SPA, the ICJ took a different approach, allowing the United States to represent the US 
shareholders of the existing company.233 Thus, the states of foreign shareholders’	nationality 
may potentially exercise diplomatic protection against Ukraine as the state of incorporation. 
 Even when the nationality link is established and domestic remedies are exhausted, 
the state does not have an obligation to exercise diplomatic protection. Lord Phillips MR 
concluded: ‘[..i]t is clear that international law has not yet recognised that a state is under a 
duty to intervene by diplomatic or other means to protect a citizen who is suffering or [is 
being] threatened with injury in a foreign state’.234 
 However, as a recommended practice, i.e. not binding under customary law, article 19 
of DADP suggests that due consideration be given to requests of diplomatic protection.235 
National case law supports this approach in common law jurisdictions.236 
c)   Reparations 
Since the injury in the diplomatic protection context is suffered by the state of nationality, 
then there is no obligation to transfer reparations to individuals directly wronged. 237 
However, article 19 of the DADP recommends that this be implemented as good practice.238   
 If investment treaty claims are assessed purely on the basis of the harm caused to the 
economic interests of the investor, damages suffered by an injured alien are never identical in 
kind with the state’s injury.239 
 That reparations may be out of reach to the investor does not equate to there not being 
an incentive to pursue the diplomatic protection avenue. In some instances, cessation of the 
wrongful act240 would satisfy the investor’s expectations, in others cessation may equate 
restitution.241 
 In sum, injured aliens have a right to request their home state to exercise diplomatic 
protection on their behalf at any stage after the injury was suffered, or if the respondent state 
is not complying with an award or decision obtained in an investor-state arbitration 
proceeding or before a human rights court. Diplomatic protection may be considered as a 
safety net –	an alternative venue for protection or an instance of last resort. In the absence of 																																																								
233 ELSI case (n 212).  
234 R (Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ 1598, [2003] 
UKHRR 76 [69] (Lord Phillips MR) (emphasis added). 
235 DADP (n 201) art 19.  
236 R (Abbasi) (n 234).  
237 La Grand Case (Germany v United States) (Judgment) [2001] ICJ Rep 466. 
238 DADP (n 201) art 19. 
239 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Merits) [1928] PCIJ Rep Series A No 17. 
240 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries’ (1954 
–2001) UNGAOR Supp no 10 UN Doc A/56/10 (ASRIWA) arts 29, 30. 
241 ibid art 33. See also Paparinskis (n 24). 
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investment or human rights frameworks diplomatic protection may be the only available 
international remedy. 
 Diplomatic protection on behalf of shareholders can be exercised against the state 
whose actions caused an international wrong, including the state of incorporation. Therefore, 
the states of shareholders’	nationality may consider exercising diplomatic protection against 
Ukraine –	 the state of incorporation in the Crimea scenario. At the policy level, the state of 
shareholder’s nationality may regard its diplomatic interest in strengthening ties with Russia 
as prevailing over its interest in the matter of its national. This may be a highly probable 
outcome because the position and interest of the state in a particular dispute is different from 
the investors’	entrepreneurial focus and economic interests. 
 
E.  CONCLUSIONS 
The annexation of Crimea illustrates a challenge to the international legal order in general 
and the regime of foreign investment protection in particular. Several investment claims 
brought under the framework of the Russia-Ukraine BIT by Ukrainian companies raised 
concerns about the prospects of investment treaty protection of Ukrainian and foreign 
nationals in the annexed territory of Crimea from the spectrum of available international 
venues for redress analysed in this article. 
 The objective difficulties which might impede the implementation of investment 
treaties in the circumstances of illegal use of force were solved in human rights case law and 
established in principles of extraterritorial protection. This article suggests that the human 
rights framework for the protection of individual and property rights extraterritorially and 
regardless of the injured alien’s nationality make the ECtHR a more accessible venue for the 
protection of Ukrainian investors in Crimea than options available under investor-state 
arbitration. This, however, does not apply to shareholders. Their standing under the 
individual application process is limited to the protection of direct property rights. In this 
instance, the investor-state arbitration system offers a comprehensive case law on indirect 
investment protection under particular treaty instruments. 
 Furthermore, this article demonstrates that diplomatic protection provides an 
important opportunity, which may be the only one available in some instances, e.g. in cases 
of injured aliens whose home states do not have investment treaties with Russia in the Crimea 
scenario. However, diplomatic protection is discretional and limited by the political 
reluctance and pursuits of the state that may be different from the interests of the injured 
investor. Importantly, the Russian Federation is one of the five permanent members of the 
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Security Council with veto-wielding power; therefore, some states of injured aliens’	
nationality will be more likely to exercise diplomatic protection against it than others, a 
decision that would hinge on ‘realpolitik’	concerns.242 
 In terms of practical considerations, both the human rights and diplomatic protection 
regimes provide for ‘half a loaf’	protection, which is in any event better than ‘no bread’. In 
other words, just satisfaction or mere cessation of the wrongful act could provide sufficient 
(or at least acceptable) redress to investors who cannot gain access to remedies providing for 
standards akin to full reparation. 
 With respect to challenges, the annexation of Crimea will undoubtedly shape the 
potential treaty drafting practice that should appropriately answer the changing dynamics of 
international relations. Furthermore, since the territorial and the use of force questions in the 
Crimea scenario are unlikely to be fully resolved in the foreseeable future,243 they still will be 
conditioned by the domino consequences of pending and upcoming separate investment and 
human rights claims. Since the prohibition to legitimise Russia’s illegal annexation does not 
preclude courts and tribunals to make their findings, these sectoral disputes may cause the 
illegality of the annexing state’s conduct to be highlighted and possibly built up from a ‘one 
case at a time’ judicial approach.244 
Human rights consequences, extraterritorial conduct, and huge losses for investors 
seem to be more easily talked about and dealt with because they do not require the 
international community to take a definite stand in the bigger political debate that would 
entail huge economic and legal consequences. The conclusion that follows is that investment 
and human rights claims connected with the annexation of Crimea set up the stage for bigger 
questions to be addressed in the future.	
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